Suzy B Software 2/Suzy B Software CD-ROM 2 (1994).iso/nasa/nasaqual/nasaqual.asc

Text File | 1995-05-02 | 40.3 KB | 674 lines

NEWS CONFERENCE BY VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE AND NASA ADM. RICHARD TRULY
                           Dec. 10, 1990
                           Time: 11 a.m.
              Location: Old Executive Office Building
  Topic: The final report of the Advisory Committee on the Future
                     of the U.S. Space Program

     VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE:  Good morning.  Dick Truly and I have just
come from the National Space Council meeting where we have been briefed in
depth by the Augustine Committee. Norm Augustine, Laurel Wilkening and
their committee members were just absolutely superb, and on behalf of the
president, Norm, let me just once again thank you and the members of the
committee for a tremendous effort and a serious substantive report.
     The review has been comprehensive and now it is our challenge to begin
its implementation.  We gave the committee a very broad mandate.  We told
them everything was on the table, nothing was off the table, and it's clear
to me that the committee has met, if not exceeded, our expectations.  They
have done a serious and thorough job.  They've maintained their
independence.  They've produced a great report that takes on tough issues.
The recommendations are specific and appear to reflect today's budget
realities.  This report is not a buy everything wish list. As I have stated
many times, our space program is in transition. We are moving from an era
of temporary space encounters to an era of permanent exploration of space.
     Overall, I think the recommendations have the effect of sharpening the
focus of our space program.  The priorities will be changed toward
achieving two specific and understandable long-term goals--a mission to
Planet Earth, and a mission from Planet Earth.  This report will give our
space program a needed shot in the arm.
     The report mandates serious reform efforts as well as charting a new
path into our space future.
     According to the report America must have a vigorous, balanced and
affordable space program which emphasizes space science and focuses our
programs on the two specific goals I mentioned--a mission to Planet Earth
and a mission from Planet Earth.
     To do this, the report concludes we need a complete redesign of the
space station to reduce costs and complexity, to begin a new launch system
while phasing out the space shuttle.
     To either completely restructure the personnel system or begin a
conversion of NASA centers to the JPL model.
     This report clearly points out the need--the need for fundamental
change and changes in our civil space programs.  We will make changes.  We
will reconvene this committee in approximately six months to assess on how
well we are doing on implementing their recommendations.
     Finally, I want to thank Dick Truly and the NASA staff for the
tremendous support and effort that they gave to this committee. They were
absolutely superb.  Their cooperation was vigorous and we could not have
been in this position at this time without the support of Dick Truly and
his entire NASA team. With that, Dick, I invite you to make a comment or
two.

     RICHARD TRULY:  Thank you, Mr. Vice President.   I want to first join
with you in a sincere thanks to every member of this committee who I've
worked closely with over the last several months, and particularly, Norm,
to you, for leading this group in a short period of time, dealing with
tough issues, dealing with an agency that is--that is managing a very
complex and wonderful space program for our country.  And I must say that
at the end of this work of yours, I'm extremely pleased with the work that
you've done, with the general tone of the report that you--that you have
put out the executive summary of today.  I'm very satisfied with that and
with the general supportive words that you've had for our civil space
program and for NASA.
     You've made a number of recommendations, many of which are right on
the track of the direction that we're going, and many are--are changes of
one direction or another, and I can tell you that NASA and I intend to take
each of those recommendations most seriously as we take a look at how they
can be implemented and what the effects of that will be.
     I note that you put out a call, a strong need in the space program for
a predictable and--and--a predictable and stability of resources, in order
to match whatever (audio drop) that you've given the people of NASA and the
Space Council as we move forward.  Thank you, sir.

     VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE:  Now I'm going to turn the press conference
over to Norm Augustine and again want to congratulate him and his committee
on the outstanding job that they have done.  He will be making an opening
statement, not longer than 60 minutes, probably around five to ten minutes,
and then he will be more than happy to entertain any specific questions
that you may have.  Norm, thank you very much.

     NORM AUGUSTINE:  Well, thank you, Mr. Vice President.  I do plan to
take about five or six minutes to summarize our findings.  You have  I
think the documents in front of you.  I should say that many of my
colleagues on the committee are in the room as well and they want to
comment themselves.
     Our committee has 12 members, it was selected to be as diverse as
possible, people from industry, people from academia, former military, some
former members of Congress, scientists, people from universities, and so
on.
     Our findings are unanimous, with one footnote with regard to the
findings on launch vehicles.  I chose to recuse myself because of my role
as chairman and because of my company's involvement in those matters.
Other than that, the findings are, as I said, unanimous.
     We believe America's civil space program is at a crossroads today.
The crossroads where we need to set out an integrated space plan, a plan
that people could support, that funding can be made available with
continuity.  We find that NASA is neither as troubled as some would
suggest, not nearly as good as it will have to be to carry out the kind of
space programs that we've recommended.  The program we recommended is
constituted of five closely integrated and balanced parts--and I emphasize
balance.
     The first is a science program--that's the keystone of the space
program that we see, and should have highest priority.
     We see two major missions, as the vice president described, a mission
from Planet Earth and a mission to Planet Earth, the mission to Planet
Earth addressing some of the very key global environmental questions that
are--are troubling our entire planet today.
     The mission from Planet Earth would have as its long-term goal a
mission to--for the manned exploration of Mars, with shorter term
activities on board the space station, and a base on the moon.  The latter
two being--the Mars mission and the moon application being a considerable
time in the future, obviously.
     Before we undertake a program of that magnitude, we think it's
critical that we deal with two matters of infrastructure.  The first is to
rebuild the technology base in this country which supports our space
program.
     The technology base has been badly neglected for nearly two decades...
it's been allowed to atrophy. It affects America's competitiveness, it
affects our ability to successfully undertake space missions.
     The second piece of the infrastructure that we believe needs to be
addressed has to do with transportation in space. The transportation is
obviously the key to the doorway to space. Our civil space program today is
very heavily dependent, almost entirely dependent, upon the use of the
space shuttle.  The space shuttle, as everyone recognizes, is an extremely
capable system for missions where human beings are required.  On the other
hand, our committee believes that it should be limited use only to those
cases where there's important value added by human presence.  We are
concerned that the space shuttle may be the thin reed that supports our
entire civil space program, and because of that we think--we conclude--that
it's time to begin phasing over from the space shuttle onto a new unmanned
but man-ratable heavy-lift launch vehicle that could cost less than a space
shuttle, could be available in the fairly near future--might use space
shuttle components to save cost; for example, launch sites, possibly even
some of the hardware.  But that such a system would be brought on early so
that we wouldn't be so totally dependent upon the space shuttle.
     We're reluctant to raise what I'm about to say because it's commonly
not discussed, but I think it's important, and our committee believes it's
important, that we realize that the laws of probability, with all their
uncertainties, suggest that we can't count on not losing another space
shuttle in the not-too-distant future.  And in fact it would not be at all
surprising to us that we would lose at least another space shuttle before
the space station is on orbit.
     Because of that I think we need to prepare ourselves both emotionally
and in terms of hardware and infrastructure to deal with that.  And that is
one of our committee's findings.
     I believe that's a reasonable summary, other than to say to you that
we've made a number of recommendations in the management area for Admiral
Truly.  We believe that it's only proper that people who have
responsibility for an organization should have the latitude to organize it
as they see fit.  So we've made suggestions in the management area, rather
profound ones, but we not put them as firm recommendations.
     Finally, with regard to the Space Station Freedom, we believe it plays
a very important role as the next step in the manned space program dealing
with human factors, the study of human activities in space, studies of long
duration in space exposure on the human system.  And we strongly endorse a
space station.  By the same token, the space station we now have in its
present configuration we believe is too complex, far too costly, it depends
too much on the space shuttle, it doesn't permit adequate testing before
placement in orbit--and we have recommended that the redesign that's under
way in fact be continued and not be limited necessarily to the 90-day
period that the Congress has allocated for that, but that we should take as
a country whatever amount of time it takes to reconfigure the space station
so that we have a system that will be viable and earn the support of both
the Congress and the public.
     I will close by saying that our committee could not have been
supported better by NASA.  We visited all the NASA centers, we visited
several hundred witnesses, we had hundreds of just wonderful letters from
people--from students, from professors, from young people, old people,
people in NASA, people outside of NASA.  People really do care about
America's space program, and it's our hope that whatever our
findings--however they might be treated--they can at least be viewed
constructively as the place to start in laying out a space program that we
can get the country behind, because absent that we do think we are at a
crossroads where otherwise American will tend to drift in space.
     That concludes the opening remarks I chose to make on behalf of our
committee.  We would be very happy to answer any questions on any subject
that you might have.


     Q:  Mr. Augustine, where would you see the manned program going beyond
(inaudible)?  This is a 21st-century issue. Once you phase out the current
shuttle, are you really looking more toward a smaller vehicle, (inaudible)
separation of heavy cargo from manned launch (inaudible)?

     AUGUSTINE:  Yes, we would see the role of man would not be so much in
transporting hardware into space.  With perfect hindsight--and I emphasize
that--we would view it as a mistake to risk seven people and a fourth of
our orbiters to place a telecommunications satellite in orbit.
     Our view would be that we should develop a capable, expendable,
unmanned obviously launch vehicle that perhaps would have a manned capsule
that could be used to transport humans. In the meantime, of course, the
shuttle is our sole means of putting people in space, so one has to
continue the shuttle program until we can phase in this new capability.
     In terms of the long role for man in space, your question--I wouldn't
limit it to the role on transportation--that's probably the least important
role.  I think the more important role is the exploration role of humans,
and we believe that if you ask the question as we did, should America be
content with a space program that has no human involvement, only an
unmanned program, our conclusion is a resounding no--we think it would be a
very hollow program.  If that's the case, then, one says what is the
long-term goal?  The logical goal almost certainly has to be Mars.  The
only question is when we go there, whether Americans are involved in going
there or not.


     Q:  Mr. Augustine, besides the law of averages, what leads you to draw
the conclusion that we might lose another space shuttle?

     AUGUSTINE:  I would say several things.  One is the law of averages,
which we've studied a good deal in statistics, as have others.  I think
engineering jue very challenging indeed.  And the shuttle is a very complex
piece of hardware, as everyone in this room certainly would understand.
And although we certainly don't mean to predict problems, we believe we
should be prepared for them.
     And for all of those reasons we think we should certainly anticipate
the very real possibility of losing another orbiter in the foreseeable
future.

     Q:  Do you see NASA as necessarily the lead agency to do this
(inaudible)?

     AUGUSTINE:  We did not address specifically who should be the lead
agency.  NASA clearly has a key role, I guess unarguably, together with one
other agency, the role for gathering data from space, NOAA in particular.
     But it would be our view, and we expressed this in the report that
you'll receive in its full volume a week from now. It's at the printers.
We expressed the view that the environmental studies program of which space
is a part, an important part but by no means the only part, touches on a
large number of aspects of the U.S. government and other governments. It
includes data from weather satellites; it includes data from the Department
of Defense.
     And so our sole recommendation to the Space Council was that it pay
very careful attention to the fact that it needs a strong coordinating body
which probably would not be NASA although we didn't express the firm
conclusion.
     Yes, ma'am.

     Q:  If (inaudible) predicted the possibility of losing another
shuttle, A, what will this do to the morale of the current crop of
astronauts?  Do you expect a mass exodus?  And (inaudible) recruiting
astronauts?

     AUGUSTINE:  I think there is no one more acutely aware of the risks of
flying a space shuttle than the men and women who are astronauts.  I
suspect they are far more aware than anyone on our committee of those
risks, and believe them, as we believe them, to be well worth the costs.
And by no means would I want to have our committee pose any discouragement
in that regard.
     We believe the shuttle is a viable system, an important system. We
should continue to try to make it better, but we should also hedge our
bets, and be prepared for whatever might happen.
     Sir.

     Q:  Mr. Augustine, you say (inaudible) no one knows how much a shuttle
launch costs.  Can you tell us?

     AUGUSTINE:  Let me deal with the former question first.  With respect
to--what was the former question?  Help me? Oh, yes, concerns
self-inflicted by NASA upon itself.
     Various things come to mind.  One thing that comes to mind is in cost
estimating.  NASA keeps their bookkeeping according to various accounts.
And when asked what something costs, they tend to give an answer which is
an accurate answer about what the cost of a given account is.
     For example, with a space station, the original number that was fixed
in many people's minds was $8 billion.  But that didn't include the
accounts that include launch vehicles or space operations or inflation.
And as a result, when those other numbers are included, it looks like
NASA's lost control of the program, which really is the wrong conclusion,
but one could well see why that happens.
     So we think some things could be done in the area of cost estimating
that could help avoid that kind of problem. That's just one example.
     What does a shuttle operation cost?  We don't know the answer. We
didn't devote a great deal of time to try to find out, because it was not
of enormous consequence to us.
     The cost was not the driving reason for why we made our
recommendations about phasing to another launch capability. The costs of
course get involved in how you choose to allocate the cost of maintaining
the operations at the Cape, some of which do other things that launch
shuttles.  It includes how much inflation you include, and so on.
     And we don't know the answer to that, nor do we particularly seek it
out.

     Q:  (Inaudible) summarize your views on what brought NASA to this
crossroads now from a time in the '60s when it seemed to have strong
direction, strong public support, what brought us from there to here?

     AUGUSTINE:  We addressed that in some depth in the actual body of the
report which you don't yet have.  Clearly times have changed.
     In the early phase of the space program, there was a heavy drive of
competing with the Soviets.  The Sputnik, you'll recall, in the fall of
1957, had just an enormous impact on the United States. And at that time,
the president set out a specific goal, and just concern over competition
with the Soviets tend to drive the Apollo program to get to the moon first.
     Today there is not that clear competition.  It's more the fundamental
values of exploring, of wanting to learn, to uncover the unknown, things
that drove explorers all the way from Magellan to today.
     And there are less tangibles, but we think no less important. The--we
also point out that it's important as a matter of perspective.  We all are
frustrated by problems of hydrogen leaks, problems with seals, with
problems with spherical aberration.  Believe me, no one is more frustrated
by that than the people at NASA.
     At the same time, those are so recent we tend to remember them, even
though some of their origins is some time ago.  And the spherical
aberration problem occurred and should have been found in the tests that
occurred a decade ago.
     But as you look back to the glory days of the space program that some
of us lived through, you will remember that all was not glory.  The first
attempt to put up an earth satellite by this country failed.
    By 1959, as I recall, over--or just about two-thirds of our satellite
launches had failed. I think it was 11 of the first 12 attempts to send a
probe to the moon in preparation for the Apollo program failed.
     We lost three astronauts in a fire on the ground.  We had an explosion
in a fuel cell on Apollo 13 on the way to the moon.  I say that because in
no way do we want to condone problems or to accept them.  They should not
be accepted.
     Perfection is the only goal. And the people we entrust with carrying
out our space program need to understand that. But we have had problems in
the past, and we'll continue to have them in the future no matter how hard
people try.
     Yes, sir?

     Q:  (Inaudible) unmanned heavy lift launch vehicle costs, estimate in
ranges, or anything like that?

     AUGUSTINE:  It has been priced, by NASA, and I would rather they
address that question, but let me say that it's of the general order of
magnitude of buying another orbiter.  And it would be our conclusion that
we would be better served to buy the new launch vehicle, to develop the new
launch vehicle, than to buy an additional shuttle orbiter No. 106.   Way in
the back.

     Q:  (Inaudible) billions of dollars.

     AUGUSTINE:  Several billion dollars, but I would like NASA to deal
with that specifically.

     Q:  (Inaudible) shuttle as soon as possible--as soon as there's
another alternative?

     AUGUSTINE:  The intention will be to phase down the pressure--the
scheduled pressure on the shuttle, particularly for missions that don't
demand human activity, as soon as possible and phase down.  But the shuttle
will continue, at least for some time, to be our means of performing
missions that involve human involvement--where human presence is required.
This new launch vehicle would be intended, at least initially, to be
unmanned, to reduce cost and (inaudible).

     Q:  (Inaudible) use this other vehicle for humans as well, and--

     AUGUSTINE:  I think that that's looking so far in the future. That's
certainly a possibility.  But I wouldn't say that we laid a road map out.
We intend to address that part of the issue in the next 10 year road map.

     Q:  (Inaudible) shuttle's going to be down to three or four a year,
instead of a dozen?

     AUGUSTINE:  That is very possible, and that's one very important
reason why we'd like the new launch vehicle to share launch pads--the
people and talent--with the existing shuttles, at least in their initial
phase, before you bring in some more advanced technology that's now in
development.

     Q:  For many of these recommendations to become reality, you will need
to have some kind of consensus with the Hill.  Do you have any insight
right now into what some of the key congressional players in the space
program will think of these recommendations?

     AUGUSTINE:  You're absolutely right, that either these recommendations
or any other space program obviously requires the support of the people on
Capitol Hill.  I have no insight into how they might react to our
findings.  I would hope they would consider them carefully.  We've met with
any number of people on Capitol Hill, including staff members during the
120 days we've been working.  We've had these very candid discussions with
the people on the Hill.  We've learned a great deal from their comments,
and I feel quite confident that they'll consider very carefully what we've
said.  But I really have no idea at all how individuals would react.
Sir--in the back.

     Q:  Can you expand on your JPL (inaudible) throttle, and are you
suggesting that all of the NASA field centers need (inaudible)--

     AUGUSTINE:  Yes, I'm glad you raised that particular issue. That
addressed the personnel issue.  We are not (inaudible) that NASA, in the
future, will be able to maintain the type of talent--(inaudible) specialty
talent--that one needs to conduct an aggressive space program for the long
term.  To be--to work on a space program, you literally have to be a rocket
scientist.  At least some of the people have to be rocket scientists.  And
when you try to think about the job of hiring and keeping rocket
scientists, and other talented individuals under today's civil service
rules, it does not give our committee a great deal of comfort.
     In fact, we believe, that it is essential that the civil service rules
be revised to recognize these specialty talents, be revised in terms of
paying people competitive salaries, making it possible for them to move,
and not to be financially harmed; making it possible for them to be paid
for performance, to be hired quickly, and to be fired if they don't
perform.  We think that is absolutely essential, and we hope the civil
service regulations can be modified to do just that.
     And in fact, some steps have rather recently been taken in that
direction that we found encouraging.  If that's not possible, we would hope
that NASA could be exempted from the civil service regulations for at
least--to start with--perhaps 10 percent of the very key people.  If that's
not possible, we then would suggest the beginning of phase over--gradual
phase over--because it's admittedly difficult to do--of the various NASA
centers to a model along the lines of that currently used by the jet
propulsion laboratory (inaudible) federal contract research center, or a
federally contracted research center.
     That model provides, in the case of JPL, that the people there work
for Cal Tech--the university.
    The university oversees JPL in support of NASA--under contract of
NASA.  It has the benefit that people could be paid competitive salaries.
They have independent technical oversight, a measure of excellence that
comes from association with a university.  If they don't perform, they can
be fired.  And they can be paid adequately to take temporary assignments
elsewhere.  In other words, they have the latitudes a free enterprise
system provides for first class people, and NASA has a lot of first class
people, and it's going to need a lot more, and it's going to have to keep
them.  And the FCRC approach, the JPL model, we think is a very good one,
but it's very difficult to get to there from where we are today.
     So it would not be our first choice.  But if all else fails, we think
we should move in that direction, so that we can take care of the people
that are at NASA.  Sir.

     Q:  From what I understand, your reports says, in hindsight, in
regards to the Challenger accident, it was inappropriate to risk the lives
of astronauts to deploy a communications satellite.  I believe the 1991
manifest calls for a mission to deploy a similar satellite, risking the
lives of astronauts. Should that launch be scrubbed?  Did you look at the
manifest and make recommendations to specific launches that are coming up?

     AUGUSTINE:  NASA, itself, has agreed that the use of the space shuttle
should be focused on missions that really do have value added for human
presence.  And NASA, itself, has a policy and is moving in that direction.
With regard to some of the near-term missions, the commitments were made so
long ago and the matter of manifesting for the space program is so complex,
that to make an arbitrary sudden ruling as of 11:00 this morning from here
on, we'll use the shuttle only for human intensive missions, would be
counter-productive.
     I think NASA considered this rather carefully, and they conclude that
the mission should proceed.  And although we didn't study that particular
mission in great detail, I don't think we would disagree.  Sir.

     Q:  (Inaudible) what do you think is a realistic time line for all
these things to happen?

     AUGUSTINE:  I would say our committee is very optimistic that a lot
can be done in six months.  Clearly, you can't implement everything we've
said, but one can certainly begin, and we encourage the use of a six month
date, just like we encourage 120 days for our committee, which was a rather
short time.  Because it puts a time pressure on that gives you a
milestone.  If we picked the milestone two years away, that makes it easier
for things to sort of slide.  I'm absolutely convinced, as are my
colleagues on the committee that NASA is going to take these
recommendations very seriously.  I know Admiral Truly has said he would,
and that the effort will proceed ahead.  We also have the advantage, unlike
many committees, from the outside.
     The vice president has taken a strong personal interest in this.  I
met with him a number of times.  He's met with the entire committee twice.
I've had a number of conversations with him over the telephone.  I think
he'd dedicated to following through.  The president, himself, met with me
when we began.
    And while we certainly asked for no assurances of serious
consideration, we have every reason to believe our recommendations will
believe that to the extent they deserve it.  And that should really be the
measure.  Yes, ma'am.

     Q:  (Inaudible) problems is that it's over-committed, over-extended.
(Inaudible) you have added some programs (inaudible) and stretched some
things out, but how are you dealing with that program?  Can you be a little
more specific as to where things are going to get (inaudible)?

     AUGUSTINE:  I surely can.  That's an important question.  We have a
basic assumption that the nation will be prepared to spend for a good space
program, well executed, with clear goals, an increase in spending on the
order of approximately 10 percent per year in real dollars.  Last year the
increase supported by the Congress and the administration--and the
administration was supportive of a larger number--but eight and a half
percent was supported, even with all the difficult budgetary issues our
government faces today.  The space program--civil space program--has seen
real growth for about 15 years now, virtually every year--moderate, but
nonetheless real.  The average American today spends about a dollar a week
to underwrite the civil space program.
     So we predicate there being some growth in spending. We also offer
some alternatives, if indeed, that doesn't happen. Some of the alternatives
we offer--one is to not proceed ahead, at least at this time, with an
additional shuttle orbit.  That's a major saving.  We propose redesigning
the space station will make major savings.  We believe a new launch vehicle
can make savings.
     We suggested that the mission from planet Earth be keyed not to a
calendar schedule, but rather to the availability of funds, so that it
doesn't encroach on the science program. In other words, it will be on a go
as you pay basis.
     We noted that programs like the national aerospace plane--an important
program--just the kind of program NASA should do--probably doesn't have
huge schedule urgency (inaudible) to it. We've made a number of management
recommendations, which candor would require that we say will probably not
make huge cost savings.  We think they'll greatly increase the
effectiveness of management, but may themselves lead to some modest cost
savings.
     So those are some of the kinds of things that we've tried to address
and to make a realistic program, with some margins.  So who have I missed
here?  Sir.

     Q:  (Inaudible) Admiral Truly and discuss the recommendations? Did you
discuss his reaction to the suggested--management suggestions that you may
(inaudible) he indicated he was willing to follow through with those?

     AUGUSTINE:  Yes, well you heard Admiral Truly say that he was going to
very seriously address the recommendations we've made. I would not expect
that he would agree with them all. Certainly if an outside group came and
made recommendations to me on how to run my company, I doubt that I would
agree with them all.  But I'm absolutely confident that he'll very
seriously consider them.
     And I should say there are probably reasons in the management area why
you wouldn't accept them all.
     For example, our recommendations lead to the longer term.  If he's in
mid stream in some programs. He knows issues involving people that we don't
know, commitments that have been made, particular skills people have that
we're not as familiar on, as would be Admiral Truly.  But I think all of us
are quite convinced that we'll get a serious hearing and eventually,
probably, you know, many of the, if not most of the recommendations will be
implemented.  But that really is up to him, because he bears the
responsibility of the performance of the agency, whereas we all have the
luxury of walking away tomorrow, having done what we were asked to do, and
I hope--let's see, in the very, very back.

     Q:  (Inaudible) how likely is it that we're going to lose another
shuttle, and why (inaudible)?

     AUGUSTINE:  We are committed as a nation to the shuttle for the next
five to 10 years, no matter what the concerns are.  Now, I don't mean for a
moment to suggest that our committee believes there is going to be danger
in flying the shuttle.  As a matter of fact, the shuttle is far safer than
most of the test aircraft that have been flown as part of the military
program.  It's far safer.  It--for a milestone, if that means anything, and
it probably doesn't--is safer than, I think, commercial airliners
--certainly safer than your car.
     I'd be pleased to fly in the space shuttle.  One of our members, Pete
Aldridge, who I think is scheduled to go on the second flight after the
Challenger, and I would bet pete will have been pleased to go.  Phil has
been on the shuttle.  It's a matter of relative risks and importance.  And
it's not only the risk of human life.  It's the risk of hardware.  It's
unlikely we'll ever have over five shuttles in the inventory--probably
four.  And if you lose one, you've lost a fourth of your capability.  And
that does trouble us.
     By no means do we demean the shuttle, but we do think it is not a
particularly robust system to base a large part of the civil space program
on.  Now, in the very, very corner.

     Q:  Frankly my question feeds into what you just said, which is I
presume that one of the (inaudible) recommendations in regard to this
(inaudible)--this is an assumption.  I'm trying to find out if this
assumption is true.  But part of your reason for recommending that in this
accelerated development of a human schedule, is to be able to use that for
construction and replacement of space stations?

     AUGUSTINE:  We believe that the new heavy lift unmanned launch vehicle
could, in fact, be used to deploy at least part of the space station--the
latter parts, at least. And it could certainly be used for the logistics
downstream, which is really an important part of the space station.  The
space station represents a departure, as did the shuttle, from the space
program of the 1950's and '60's that was alluded to earlier, and that the
earlier program tended to involve one time events.  You went to the Moon
and you came home.  You flew a few orbits and you came home.
     But the shuttle programs go on and on.  The space station will go on
and on indefinitely.  The lunar program will certainly involve putting
bases that that will be at least intermittently manned and probably
eventually permanently staffed by humans. So I think your premise is
basically correct.
     Fine, yes ma'am.

     Q:  Could you comment a little more about NASA's relationship with the
commercial space sector?  What for example would you recommend that NASA do
to change its attitude about letting the commercial space sector show
(inaudible).

     AUGUSTINE:  So that you can calibrate this, I should say that our
committee are strong believers in the free enterprise system. We believe
that government should do only those things that can't be done in the
private sector, including universities, industrial firms, and so on.
     There are many such things, incidentally, that cannot be done by the
private sector that relate to space.  And we rely on the government to do
that in this country.
     It would be our view that in the last few years, probably not before
that, in the last few years NASA has made very real efforts to support
commercialization of space.  It has an office that helps in that regard.
The Department of Transportation has an important role in that regard that
it carries out.
     The--just today we were at a small firm that NASA's supporting to put
units on board the space shuttle to carry scientific experiments, a private
undertaking, commercial undertaking.
     NASA has supported the development of an upper stage commercially.  At
the same time I'm afraid that all of us who are enthused about
privatization, and I'm one of them, we do have to realize that the space
program is still young.  We're in space today where the airline--airplane
business was in about 1940 I guess or '35.  We still have a lot to
accomplish before we can truly commercialize.
     And although you didn't suggest it, let me say that the notion of
commercializing the space shuttle, we believe to be falling.  We should
never confuse that type of system with operating commercial airlines.
     But NASA has taken steps, we think, to support commercialization. I
think more such steps are needed.  The Landsat program is another example
where probably there was too much exuberance to the ideal goal of putting
it in the private sector before the private sector was really fully ready
to handle it. It takes a certain nurturing of the transfer.  And the
transfer is embodied by the old NACA that deals with aeronautics, is just
an absolutely superb model for what could be done where the NACA helped
build an aerospace industry in this country that became dominant in
commercial airliners.  The NASA needs to do that same thing over time, in
our judgement, with respect to space models and so on.
     Okay, one last question.

     Q:  You said that NASA should take as long as possible to redesign the
space station correctly.  How long do you think that project is going to
take, and what kind of design would you like to see?

     AUGUSTINE:  I'm afraid I'm going to have to disappoint you with regard
to both answers.  We really don't know how long that will take.  Ninety
days sounds to us like a very short time. Maybe possible.  But I think it
would be our view that the time is less important than the outcome.  And
even though the Congress had said do it in 90 days, if it takes more time,
let's take that time and let's really do it right and get a space station
that everyone can get behind and support.
     With regard to what design do we recommend they adopt, I must confess
to you that many of the members of our committee are engineers.  And we
found ourselves enjoying nothing more than designing space stations.  And
we rigorously tried to stop ourselves from doing that because that's NASA's
job and their contractor's job and not our job.  So we tried to address how
can we build a better NASA, what should be the space program in the
future.  And we tried not to do that job that NASA itself knows how to do
better than we do even though we (inaudible).

     Q:  One aspect, Mr. Augustine, in the space programs that I don't see
addressed in here is the international aspect. I'm wondering whether you
considered at as a way for the U.S. to save money (inaudible) sort of
reaction (inaudible).

     AUGUSTINE:  The--we did get inputs from many of America's
international partners to the space program.  Our State Department was kind
enough to query some of the other countries' space agencies with regard to
our charter and give us their inputs, and they were very helpful.
     When you do get our report, you'll find that the recommendation with
regard to space stations is prefaced that in concert with our international
partners, we should so and so.
     And we believe an international agreement is a promise, and our
country lives by its promises. And--so that's very easy.  Things change
that may warrant reconsideration and a partnership with our allies, and
that's very appropriate.  But clearly commitments are commitments.
     With respect to the broader issue of international agreements, we did
address that during the report.  We believe that particularly as we go on
to the longer range missions, like the Mars mission that there's great
value to having international partners, both from political benefits to
better understanding, of cost-sharing, of sharing technology.  Other
nations now have some fine space capabilities growing.
     We also point out though that in some areas we should be careful that
we don't let America become dependent altogether on other nations.  The
main engines would be such an example. People have suggested that we
consider buying the Soviet (inaudible) engine, which appears to be a good
engine.  The Soviets presumably might be interested in providing it to us
for an appropriate sum.
     But it's been, as I said, many years, since the engineers in this
country have built a new main engine.  And to buy abroad just undermines
the very key element of the whole space program.  So there are some things
that we think are inappropriate for international cooperation for a country
that wants to be a leader in space.
     On the other hand, there are many things we can and should cooperate
on.


The Reuter Transcript Report, Dec. 10, 1990